Use grub_calloc() when allocating memory for arrays to ensure proper
overflow checks are in place.
The HFS+ and squash4 security vulnerabilities were reported by
Jonathan Bar Or <jonathanbaror@gmail.com>.
Fixes: CVE-2025-0678
Fixes: CVE-2025-1125
Signed-off-by: Lidong Chen <lidong.chen@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Replace direct arithmetic operations with macros from include/grub/safemath.h
to prevent potential overflow issues when calculating the memory sizes.
Signed-off-by: Lidong Chen <lidong.chen@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
The test_parse() evaluates test expression recursively. Due to lack of
recursion depth check a specially crafted expression may cause a stack
overflow. The recursion is only triggered by the parentheses usage and
it can be unlimited. However, sensible expressions are unlikely to
contain more than a few parentheses. So, this patch limits the recursion
depth to 100, which should be sufficient.
Reported-by: Nils Langius <nils@langius.de>
Signed-off-by: Lidong Chen <lidong.chen@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
The size calculation of the translation buffer in
grub_gettext_getstr_from_position() may overflow
to 0 leading to heap OOB write. This patch fixes
the issue by using grub_add() and checking for
an overflow.
Fixes: CVE-2024-45777
Reported-by: Nils Langius <nils@langius.de>
Signed-off-by: Lidong Chen <lidong.chen@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Alec Brown <alec.r.brown@oracle.com>
Calculation of ctx->grub_gettext_msg_list size in grub_mofile_open() may
overflow leading to subsequent OOB write or read. This patch fixes the
issue by replacing grub_zalloc() and explicit multiplication with
grub_calloc() which does the same thing in safe manner.
Fixes: CVE-2024-45776
Reported-by: Nils Langius <nils@langius.de>
Signed-off-by: Lidong Chen <lidong.chen@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Alec Brown <alec.r.brown@oracle.com>
The grub_extcmd_dispatcher() calls grub_arg_list_alloc() to allocate
a grub_arg_list struct but it does not verify the allocation was successful.
In case of failed allocation the NULL state pointer can be accessed in
parse_option() through grub_arg_parse() which may lead to a security issue.
Fixes: CVE-2024-45775
Reported-by: Nils Langius <nils@langius.de>
Signed-off-by: Lidong Chen <lidong.chen@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Alec Brown <alec.r.brown@oracle.com>
The getblk() returns a value of type grub_int64_t which is assigned to
iagblk and inoblk, both of type grub_uint64_t, in grub_jfs_read_inode()
via grub_jfs_blkno(). This patch fixes the type mismatch in the
functions. Additionally, the getblk() will return 0 instead of -1 on
failure cases. This change is safe because grub_errno is always set in
getblk() to indicate errors and it is later checked in the callers.
Signed-off-by: Lidong Chen <lidong.chen@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Alec Brown <alec.r.brown@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
An extent's logical offset and address are represented as a 40-bit value
split into two parts: the most significant 8 bits and the least
significant 32 bits. Currently the JFS code uses only the least
significant 32 bits value for offsets and addresses assuming the data
size will never exceed the 32-bit range. This approach ignores the most
significant 8 bits potentially leading to incorrect offsets and
addresses for larger values. The patch fixes it by incorporating the
most significant 8 bits into the calculation to get the full 40-bits
value for offsets and addresses.
https://jfs.sourceforge.net/project/pub/jfslayout.pdf
"off1,off2 is a 40-bit field, containing the logical offset of the first
block in the extent.
...
addr1,addr2 is a 40-bit field, containing the address of the extent."
Signed-off-by: Lidong Chen <lidong.chen@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Alec Brown <alec.r.brown@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
While fuzz testing JFS with ASAN enabled an OOB read was detected in
grub_jfs_opendir(). The issue occurred due to an invalid directory slot
index in the first entry of the sorted directory slot array in the inode
directory header. The fix ensures the slot index is validated before
accessing it. Given that an internal or a leaf node in a directory B+
tree is a 4 KiB in size and each directory slot is always 32 bytes, the
max number of slots in a node is 128. The validation ensures that the
slot index doesn't exceed this limit.
[1] https://jfs.sourceforge.net/project/pub/jfslayout.pdf
JFS will allocate 4K of disk space for an internal node of the B+ tree.
An internal node looks the same as a leaf node.
- page 10
Fixed number of Directory Slots depending on the size of the node. These are
the slots to be used for storing the directory slot array and the directory
entries or router entries. A directory slot is always 32 bytes.
...
A Directory Slot Array which is a sorted array of indices to the directory
slots that are currently in use.
...
An internal or a leaf node in the directory B+ tree is a 4K page.
- page 25
Signed-off-by: Lidong Chen <lidong.chen@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Alec Brown <alec.r.brown@oracle.com>
The JFS fuzzing revealed an OOB read in grub_jfs_getent(). The crash
was caused by an invalid leaf nodes count, diro->dirpage->header.count,
which was larger than the maximum number of leaf nodes allowed in an
inode. This fix is to ensure that the leaf nodes count is validated in
grub_jfs_opendir() before calling grub_jfs_getent().
On the occasion replace existing raw numbers with newly defined constant.
Signed-off-by: Lidong Chen <lidong.chen@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Alec Brown <alec.r.brown@oracle.com>
Both namesize and linksize are derived from hd.size, a 12-digit octal
number parsed by read_number(). Later direct arithmetic calculation like
"namesize + 1" and "linksize + 1" may exceed the maximum value of
grub_size_t leading to heap OOB write. This patch fixes the issue by
using grub_add() and checking for an overflow.
Fixes: CVE-2024-45780
Reported-by: Nils Langius <nils@langius.de>
Signed-off-by: Lidong Chen <lidong.chen@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Alec Brown <alec.r.brown@oracle.com>
The test corpus for version-1 RAID generated an infinite recursion
in grub_partition_iterate() while attempting to read the superblock.
The reason for the issue was that the data region overlapped with
the superblock.
The infinite call loop looks like this:
grub_partition_iterate() -> partmap->iterate() ->
-> grub_disk_read() -> grub_disk_read_small() ->
-> grub_disk_read_small_real() -> grub_diskfilter_read() ->
-> read_lv() -> read_segment() -> grub_diskfilter_read_node() ->
-> grub_disk_read() -> grub_disk_read_small() -> ...
The fix adds checks for both the superblock region and the data
region when parsing the superblock metadata in grub_mdraid_detect().
Signed-off-by: Lidong Chen <lidong.chen@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
After parsing of the current entry, the entry pointer is advanced
to the next entry at the end of the "for" loop. In case where the
last entry is at the end of the data boundary, the advanced entry
pointer can point off the data boundary. The subsequent boundary
check for the advanced entry pointer can cause a failure.
The fix is to include the boundary check into the "for" loop
condition.
Signed-off-by: Lidong Chen <lidong.chen@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <sebastian@breakpoint.cc>
Tested-by: Marta Lewandowska <mlewando@redhat.com>
When an invalid node size is detected in grub_hfsplus_mount(), data
pointer is freed. Thus, file->data is not set. The code should also
set the grub_errno when that happens to indicate an error and to avoid
accessing the uninitialized file->data in grub_file_close().
Signed-off-by: Lidong Chen <lidong.chen@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
An SL entry consists of the entry info and the component area.
The entry info should take up 5 bytes instead of sizeof(*entry).
The area after the first 5 bytes is the component area. It is
incorrect to use the sizeof(*entry) to check the entry boundary.
Signed-off-by: Lidong Chen <lidong.chen@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Schmitt <scdbackup@gmx.net>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
In the code, the for loop advanced the entry pointer to the next entry before
checking if the next entry is within the system use area boundary. Another
issue in the code was that there is no check for the size of system use area.
For a corrupted system, the size of system use area can be less than the size
of minimum SUSP entry size (4 bytes). These can cause buffer overrun. The fixes
added the checks to ensure the read is valid and within the boundary.
Signed-off-by: Lidong Chen <lidong.chen@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Schmitt <scdbackup@gmx.net>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
There is no check for the end of block when reading
directory extents. It resulted in read_node() always
read from the same offset in the while loop, thus
caused infinite loop. The fix added a check for the
end of the block and ensure the read is within directory
boundary.
Signed-off-by: Lidong Chen <lidong.chen@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Schmitt <scdbackup@gmx.net>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Lidong Chen