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efi: Set shim_lock_enabled even if validation is disabled
If validation has been disabled via MokSbState, secure boot on the
firmware is still enabled, and the kernel fails to boot.
This is a bit hacky, because shim_lock is not *fully* enabled, but
it triggers the right code paths.
Ultimately, all this will be resolved by shim gaining it's own image
loading and starting protocol, so this is more a temporary workaround.
Fixes: 6425c12cd (efi: Fallback to legacy mode if shim is loaded on x86 archs)
Cc: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
Cc: Michael Chang <mchang@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Julian Andres Klode <julian.klode@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
This commit is contained in:
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e35683317e
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1 file changed
+8
@@ -95,6 +95,14 @@ grub_efi_get_secureboot (void)
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if (!(attr & GRUB_EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS) && *moksbstate == 1)
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if (!(attr & GRUB_EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS) && *moksbstate == 1)
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{
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{
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secureboot = GRUB_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_DISABLED;
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secureboot = GRUB_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_DISABLED;
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/*
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* TODO: Replace this all with shim's LoadImage protocol, delegating policy to it.
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*
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* We need to set shim_lock_enabled here because we disabled secure boot
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* validation *inside* shim but not in the firmware, so we set this variable
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* here to trigger that code path, whereas the actual verifier is not enabled.
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*/
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shim_lock_enabled = true;
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goto out;
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goto out;
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}
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}
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